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Nebraska Records Exception Said
Preferable to Federal Proposal
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known "black-letter" law that hearsay evidence is
inadmissible. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, of-
fered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted., The
hearsay rule is in reality composed of exceptions to this prohibition
which allow the admission of hearsay under certain circumstances.
This article will consider the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, its present status under Nebraska and federal statutes
and its possible future under the Proposed Nebraska Rules of Evi-
dence (hereinafter "Nebraska Rule[s]," "Nebraska proposal" or
"Rule[s]") and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence (herein-
after "Federal Rule [s]" or "federal proposal").
In both the Nebraska and federal proposals, the phrase "records
of regularly conducted activity" rather than "the business records
exception" is used, but the latter will be employed throughout this
article since the present Nebraska and federal statutes use this ter-
minology.
Federal Rule 803 (6)'s business records exception provides that
the following would not be excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, con-
ditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, all in
the course of a regularly conducted activity, as shown by the testi-
mony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
* J.D. 1958, Creighton. Member Lincoln, Nebraska and American Bar
Associations; Association of Trial Lawyers of America; Nebraska
Association of Trial Attorneys. The author wishes to acknowledge
the assistance of Richard D. Sievers in the research and preparation
of this article.
1. PRop. NEB. R. Evm. 801(c) [hereinafter cited as RULE].
448 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 3 (1974)
The Nebraska business records exception proposal is also desig-
nated as Rule 803 (6). It provides that certain evidence would not
be excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is avail-
able. The proposal provides:
Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, or
conditions, other than opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the
time of such acts, events or conditions, in the course of a regularly
conducted activity, if it was the regular course of such activity
to make such memorandum, report, record, or data compilation at
the time of such act, event, or condition, or within a reasonable
time thereafter, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness unless the source of information or method
or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The circumstances of the making of such memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, including lack of personal knowledge
by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight.
At this point, Palmer v. Hoffman2 should be discussed, as this
case provides the basic foundation for any understanding of the
business records exception to the hearsay rule. The case involved a
railroad crossing accident. The engineer, who died before the trial,
had made a written statement about the accident's occurrence two
days after the accident to the railroad's assistant superintendent
and to a Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission representative.
At trial, the statement was offered by the railroad company to
prove how the accident occurred. The United States Court of Ap-
peals sustained an objection to the report's admissibility,3 and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous opinion by
Justice Douglas. The Supreme Court referred to the common law
rule restricting the use of business records and noted that the rule
had given impetus to legislation allowing the admissions of busi-
ness records upon limited foundational grounds.
Justice Douglas found that the engineer's statement was not a
business record as it was not made "for the systematic conduct of
the business as a business," and that such accident reports, al-
though they may be routinely prepared, have their primary utility
in litigating, not railroading.4 The Court made it clear that the
type of business records admissible under the exception were those
made systematically or as a matter of routine, and such records
had the probability of trustworthiness "because they were routine
reflections of the day to day dperations of a business." 5
The most effective method of analyzing the Nebraska and fed-
2. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
3. 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942).
4. 318 U.S. at 113.
5. Id. at 114.
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eral proposals is to examine the present statutes and cases and to
determine what changes the proposals would cause.
II. PRESENT NEBRASKA RULE
The present Nebraska statute, enacted in 1951 as the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act,6 provides:
A record of an act, condition, or event, shall, insofar as relevant,
be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness
testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it
was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time
of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court,
the sources of information, method, and time of preparation were
such as to justify its admission; Provided, that all hospital records
shall be considered business records for the purposes of sections
25-12,108 to 25-12,111.
The first decision applying the statute was Hamilton County v.
Thomson.7 In Thomson, the county brought a reimbursement ac-
tion against a husband for the per capita cost of maintaining his
wife in the state hospital for the mentally ill. The primary issue
was the rate to be charged the husband. The county used copies
of a resolution adopted by the State Board of Control and founda-
tional testimony from the Board of Control secretary. The founda-
tion was that the exhibits were regular Board of Control meeting
minutes at which maintenance rates were fixed. The offer of the
minutes was objected to for lack of foundation. The Supreme
Court simply held that the exhibit was a business record and, there-
fore, admissible.
The court next considered the statute in Higgins v. Loup River
Public Power District8 which was an action to condemn land for an
easement. In such an action, it was necessary to prove the con-
demning public power district had attempted to negotiate with the
landowner prior to filing suit. To prove this, the power district of-
fered the statement of Mr. Lusienski, head of its right of way de-
partment, who was mentally and physically incapacitated at the
time of trial. The statement was Lusienski's recollection of his
visit to the Higgins farm and conversation with Mrs. Higgins where
a threat had supposedly been made to shoot anyone coming onto
the farm. The foundational evidence revealed that Lusienski was
not required to make such a report, but he had done so and
placed it in the file regarding the case. The power district at-
tempted to admit the report under the business records exception
6. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-12,109 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
7. 158 Neb. 254, 63 N.W.2d 168 (1954).
8. 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170 (1955).
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to the hearsay rule. The court held that the Business Records as
Evidence Act had the purpose of avoiding common law rules re-
garding the admissibility of business records, and when a docu-
ment did not reach the business record status, it was relegated to
hearsay and was inadmissible. The court found that no use for
Lusienski's report had been suggested other than for litigation.
The court held the report to be self-serving hearsay and inadmis-
sible, reasoning that
[tihe rule contemplates that certain events are regularly recorded
as routine reflections of the day to day operations of a business
so that the character of the records and their earmarks of reliabil-
ity import trustworthiness, thus the recordation becomes a reliable
recitation of fact. The preparation and maintenance of notations
of events outside the operation of the business are not the record-
ations contemplated.9
Palmer was cited by the court and the decision in Higgins is obvi-
ously similar in reasoning and result.
Fries v. Goldby'0 closely touched an area which will be exten-
sively considered later in this article-medical records. In this per-
sonal injury action, the plaintiff used a chiropractor as an expert.
The chiropractor's notes and records concerning his treatment of
the plaintiff were identified as exhibits, and he used them exten-
sively to refresh his memory. At the conclusion of the chiroprac-
tor's testimony, the plaintiff offered the notes and records in evi-
dence and argued that they were admissible under the Nebraska
business records exception to the hearsay rule. The trial court re-
fused to receive the exhibits and, on appeal to the Nebraska Su-
preme Court, the lower court was affirmed. The Supreme Court
found Higgins to be the controlling authority. The court said the
chiropractor could refresh his memory with the exhibits, but to al-
low their admission into evidence would simply be cumulative. It
should be noted that Fries did not consider directly the admission
of diagnoses and opinions contained in hospital records or medical
reports.
In S. A. Sorenson Construction Co. v. Broyhill," a suit to fore-
close a mechanic's lien, the office records on cost of labor per-
formed were offered and received in evidence. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, it was found that they had been properly received
under the business records statute, and the court indicated that
proper foundation had been laid for the offer:
9. 159 Neb. at 557-58, 68 N.W.2d at 176, quoting Clainos v. United States,
163 F.2d 593, 596 (1947).
10. 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956).
11. 165 Neb. 397, 85 N.W.2d 898 (1957).
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[T]he plaintiff offered in evidence its permanent records as to the
amount of work performed under the agreement in question and
the charges therefor without a need. These records were properly
identified, the mode of preparation was described, and a qualified
witness testified that they were made in the regular course of bus-
iness near the time that the work was performed.12
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib's recognized the arrival of the
computer age and demonstrated the Nebraska Supreme Court's
flexibility in applying the presently effective business records ex-
ception statute to modern commercial transactions. The case in-
volved an action by an insurer to collect premiums earned un-
der an insurance contract. The particular exhibit in question was
a data recording of accidents, dates, losses and premiums. The
foundation was provided by the insurer's director of accounting
who testified on the exhibit's preparation. It was clear that the
exhibit was prepared for litigation since it was a retrieval of in-
formation from other taped records. The court held the exhibit
admissible under the statute. The court explained that where
taped records were prepared and stored by electronic equipment
and the information and calculations were made in the usual course
of business, the fact the exhibit involved was made by a retrieval
of the taped records for trial purposes did not render the exhibit
inadmissible. Speaking generally, the court rationalized that:
No particular mode or form of record is required. The statute was
intended to bring the realities of business and professional practice
into the courtroom and the statutes should not be interpreted nar-
rowly to destroy its obvious usefulness.' 4
Metropolitan Protection Service, Inc. v. Tanner15 clearly indi-
cated that if the elements are lacking which in theory give rise to
trustworthiness and reliability, the evidence does not qualify for
admission under the business records exception. In this case, the
exhibit offered for admission was purportedly prepared on Septem-
ber 6 and reflected surveillance services performed by the plaintiff
and its employees from May 18 to September 2. The trial court ad-
mitted the exhibit into evidence. This ruling was overturned by
the Supreme Court on the rationale that the business records ex-
ception is premised upon the belief that any trustworthy habit of
making regular records will ordinarily involve the making of the
record contemporaneously. The court listed three circumstances
affecting admissibility: the complexity of the information in the
record, the training and skill of the persons recording the informa-
12. Id. at 405, 85 N.W.2d at 903.
13. 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
14. Id. at 259, 132 N.W.2d at 875.
15. 182 Neb. 507, 155 N.W.2d 803 (1968).
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tion and the reasonableness of the time elapsed between the event
and its recordation. Obviously, the evidence in this case failed on
the last mentioned ground.
The foregoing Nebraska cases give some indication of the vari-
ety of evidence which can be admitted under the business records
exception. The cases also give an indication that the Nebraska Su-
preme Court will liberally construe the present statute. But when
the circumstances of the making of the record indicate that the
basic elements importing reliability and trustworthiness are lack-
ing, the evidence cannot be admitted under the business records
exception.
III. PRESENT FEDERAL BUSINESS
RECORDS STATUTE
The present federal statute on business records, Title 28 of the
United States Code, section 1732, is somewhat different than the
present Nebraska Business Records as Evidence Act. The federal
statute provides, as far as relevant to this article:
(a) In any court of the United States and in any court estab-
lished by Act of Congress, any writing or record, whether in the
form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum
or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be ad-
missible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event,
if made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regu-
lar course of such business to make such memorandum or record
at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within
a reasonable time thereafter.
All other circumstances of the making of such writing or rec-
ord, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker,
may be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances shall
not affect its admissibility.
The term 'business,' as used in this section, includes business,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind. 16
The federal statute provides that the circumstances of the making
of the records, such as personal knowledge or lack thereof, shall
affect the evidence's weight and not its admissibility. In contrast,
the Nebraska statute provides that the court must make a prelimi-
nary determination as to whether "the sources of information,
method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admis-
sion.' 7 The Nebraska statute also expressly provides that "all hos-
pital records shall be considered business records,' '1 8 whereas the
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964).
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-12,109 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
18. Id.
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federal statute does not contain such an express provision. This
aspect of the business records exception to the hearsay rule will be
discussed later in this article in greater detail.
The federal courts have allowed the admission of a wide vari-
ety of records and documents under the auspices of section 1732.
The following are examples of the items admitted as business rec-
ords prepared in the regular course of business under the federal
statute: a police report prepared by a police officer on standard
forms; 19 a bank department's records for such days as the defend-
ant was charged with embezzlement; 20 a bill of lading on a stolen
automobile to prove that it was removed from the manufacturer's
lot without authorization; 2' a computer printout;22 a baggage
strap tag and claim check admitted in a prosecution for the theft
of suitcases from a bus line;23 a credit report made by a credit bu-
reau;24 a death certificate, although the court held that the cor-
oner's finding as to the cause of death was not binding on the trier
of fact; 25 election records; 26 an inventory report of damaged items
prepared by a salvage company employed by the plaintiff's insur-
ance company;27 an inventor's private diary or notebook; 28 a sales
report.29 All of the foregoing items have been admitted as busi-
ness records prepared in the regular course of business.
It has been cogently stated that the purpose of section 1732 is
to permit the introduction into evidence of reports in substitution
for the actual testimony in court of the persons making those re-
19. Juaire v. Nardin, 395 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938
(1968). However, the police report generally has been held inadmis-
sible where information has been supplied to the officer from a by-
stander. Gencarella v. Fyfe, 171 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1948).
20. United States v. Currier, 454 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1972).
21. United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 980 (1971).
22. Olympic Ins. Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. Rice v. United States, 411 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1969).
24. United States v. DeFrisco, 441 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1971).
25. Smith v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 622 (W.D.
Pa. 1966).
26. Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
952 (1963). See also Klein v. United States, 176 F.2d 184 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949).
27. H.K. Porter Co. v. Halperin, 297 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961).
28. Aluminum Co. of America v. Sperry Prods., Inc., 285 F.2d 911 (6th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961). However, see Buckley
v. Altheimer, 152 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1945), where similar evidence
was denied admission as not being a business record.
29. Southard v. United States, 218 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1955); Spear v.
United States, 216 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1954). However, such evidence
was denied admission under the business records exception to the
hearsay rule in Matthew v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954).
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ports,30 and the foregoing examples readily show that the federal
courts have used the present federal statute to fufill that purpose.
Obviously, the presentation of such evidence in the form of written
or printed business records makes the evidence more readily under-
stood and eliminates the calling of witnesses, resulting in a reduc-
tion of actual trial time and a probable savings in litigation ex-
pense. Of course, it is necessary to have the proper foundation
provided by the custodian of the records or any other competent
witness in order for business records to be admitted. The founda-
tional requirements are set forth in section 1732, to-wit: that
the record was made in the regular course of business; that it was
the regular practice of such business to make a record or memor-
andum at the time of the occurrence or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
IV. NEBRASKA, FEDERAL PROPOSALS EXAMINED
The Nebraska proposal8 ' relating to records of regularly con-
ducted activity is similar in some respects to the federal proposal.32
Initially, the similarities will be discussed in general terms, the
proposals having been set forth in their entirety previously. It
seems that both proposals have common foundational grounds for
the admission of records, and it would be incumbent upon the
proponent of the evidence to establish these foundational grounds
to the satisfaction of the particular court. Although the language
may be slightly different in each proposal, the final effect seems
to be the same.
The common foundational grounds would be that the recorda-
tion had been made in the course of a regularly conducted activ-
ity; it be the regular course of such activity to so record; it be done
at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter;
and the record be by or from information transmitted by a person
with knowledge. Under both the federal and Nebraska proposals,
all of the above foundational grounds apparently would be es-
tablished by the proponent of the evidence, using either the custo-
dian of the records or other qualified persons as his witnesses.
Both proposals then turn to the province of the opponent of
the evidence by stating in effect that the evidence is admissible
under the exception, unless the source of information or method
or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
To inquire into these items to show a lack of trustworthiness, so as
30. Shultz v. Corning Glass Works, 319 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
31. RuLE 803 (6).
32. PRop. FED. R. EVID. 803 (6).
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to allow the court to refuse the admission based on lack of trust-
worthiness, seems to be the opponent's area of operation. Having
stated the foregoing, it then appears that the two proposals begin
to differ at least in language.
The Nebraska proposal provides that the circumstances of the
making of the record, including lack of personal knowledge by the
maker or entrant, may be shown to affect its weight. This would
appear to give the opponent of the evidence the right to an in-
struction to this effect, thereby allowing a jury to reduce the
weight of the evidence, even though that court had examined these
same factors on the issue of admissibility and admitted the evi-
dence. However, the federal proposal conspicuously omits this
provision. This omission is particularly interesting since the pres-
ent section 1732 contains such a provision.
The effect of the federal proposal's omission of such a provision
is uncertain. A court applying the federal proposal might find
that because of the provision in former section 1732, it is implied
that even if the evidence were admitted, the opponent of the evi-
dence is entitled to an instruction that the circumstances of the
making and the knowledge of the maker or entrant can be consid-
ered by the jury in weighing the evidence. No compelling reason
appears for eliminating this opportunity of the opponent of the
evidence.
Another possible interpretation is that by omitting the provi-
sion, it is intended that no such instruction be given and the op-
ponent of the evidence is limited to inquiring about circumstances
of preparation and knowledge of the maker with regard to admissi-
bility of the evidence. In other words, the opponent's inquiry into
these areas is to convince the trial judge that trustworthiness is
lacking and, therefore, the evidence should not be admitted. If the
opponent fails in this regard, however, he may not, under the fed-
eral proposal, get an instruction on the weight to be given the evi-
dence. The Advisory Committee Note is little help although by im-
plication this latter view seems to be supported. The note states:
[T]he rule proceeds from the base that records made in the course
of a regularly conducted activity will be taken as admissible but
subject to authority to exclude if "the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.a 3
It should be noted that both the Nebraska and federal proposals
speak in terms of "records of regularly conducted activity,"
whereas both the present federal and Nebraska statutes use the
term "regular course of business." Clearly, the proposals contem-
33. Id., Advisory Committee's Note.
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plate using the exception in areas other than business records and,
therefore, an increased application has been proposed.
The final area of difference between the Nebraska and federal
proposals is in the area of opinion and diagnosis. The federal
proposal expressly speaks of "report, record . . . in any form ...
opinions or diagnoses." Generally this is in accord with the manner
in which the present federal statute has been interpreted.3 4 The
Nebraska proposal, however, expressly excludes opinions and di-
agnoses. The proposal includes "[a] memorandum, report, record
... in any form, of facts, events, or conditions, other than opinions
or diagnoses . . . ." This is a clear and substantial departure from
the federal proposal, as well as a major change in existing Nebraska
law. The present Nebraska statute states, by virtue of a 1969 amend-
ment, "that all hospital records shall be considered business rec-
ords .... ."3 Because the present Nebraska statute speaks in terms
of hospital records being business records, and it is common know-
ledge that hospital records are primarily composed of opinion and
diagnosis, the following discussion of the change between the cur-
rent statute and the proposed rule will concentrate on hospital
records.
V. HOSPITAL RECORDS AS BUSINESS RECORDS
The federal proposal expressly includes "opinions and diag-
noses" within its terms, and the Advisory Committee Notes make
it clear that it is intended that the proposal include such items as
hospital records.36
The Nebraska proposal expressly excludes "opinions and diag-
noses." However, the comments provide little help in determining
the rationale behind this departure from both the federal proposal
and the present Nebraska statute.3 7 The Comment merely inserts
the Federal Advisory Committee Notes. The only statement in the
Comment which resembles a reason for the change provides:
[O]ther statutes declared certain hospital records privileged infor-
mation and therefore inadmissible. See section 25-12,120, R.R.S.
Neb. (reports to hospital medical staff for the purpose of evaluat-
ing hospital care); section 71-3401, R.R.S. Neb. (hospital reports
furnished to State Board of Health). ... The privileged character
of these documents is not affected by the present exception, which
concerns only the hearsay aspects of business records.3S
34. See Annot., 9 A.L.R. FED. 457 (1971).
35. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-12,109 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
36. PROP. FED. R. Evm. 803 (6) Advisory Committee's Note.
37. Rule 803 (6), Comment.
38. Id.
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The Comment also notes that the present statute is changed and
should be repealed.
The Comment states that the proposal contains the desirable
portions of the prior Nebraska and federal statutes relating to busi-
ness records. Therefore, the drafters must have found the prior
Nebraska and federal statutes and decisions which would have
admitted diagnosis and opinion in hospital records "undesirable."
The question of "why" seems to go unanswered. Perhaps, an exam-
ination of prior Nebraska and federal decisions on the hospital rec-
ords will shed some light on the question.
The only Nebraska case concerned with this issue is Anderson v.
Evans39 where it was contended that the trial court had erred in
admitting hospital records containing nurses' opinions about a pa-
tient's pain and suffering. The court made it clear, however, that
the admissibility of hospital records generally was not in question.
The nurses' notes were read to the jury and the plaintiff had used
the assistant medical records librarian for foundational purposes.
The librarian testified that the nurses' notes were normal, regular
business records of the hospital assembled in the records office
after compilation on the floors. However, there was nothing in
her testimony to identify the persons who made the notes. The
Supreme Court noted that the only previous precedent" in Ne-
braska merely indicated that hospital records were inadmissible
without foundation.
The court in Anderson then set forth the foundational require-
ments for admission of the nurses' notes: the custody from which
they came; that they were prepared in due course of hospital
work; the identity of the persons making them; how the maker ob-
tained the information; information as to accuracy; identification
of the records by the persons who made them or, if such persons
were unavailable, the reasons for their unavailability. The court
found these foundational requirements lacking. In response to the
plaintiff's contention that they were admissible under the Busi-
ness Records as Evidence Act, the court held that the foundation
under the Act was lacking and, in addition, that the notes were not
business records. As a result, the trial court's ruling was reversed
and the case remanded for a new trial.
The Business Records as Evidence Act was amended after this
decision to include hospital records as business records. Therefore,
it would seem that the Legislature intended to overrule this deci-
sion, as it is clear that nurses' notes are an integral part of hospital
39. 164 Neb. 599, 83 N.W.2d 59 (1957).
40. Willis v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 139 Neb. 46, 296 N.W. 443 (1941).
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records. The nurse makes notations throughout the patient's
stay at the hospital on various aspects of his condition, and the
physician uses the nurse's notes to determine the patient's prog-
ress. It has been recognized that the safeguards for trustworthi-
ness of a modern hospital's records are at least as substantial 'as
the guarantees of reliability of a business establishment's rec-
ords.41 The nurse's motivation for accuracy in making such notes,
for example, is at least as great as that of an accountant making
entries in a ledger.
Although numerous federal cases have uniformly allowed their
admission under the present section 1732, the admission of hospital
records may result in possible prejudice to the opponent of the evi-
dence. These federal decisions illustrate the potential problems
and possibility of prejudice in admitting hospital records with the
limited foundation required by the federal rules.
When a hospital record is offered in evidence, the standard ob-
jection is that it deprives the opponent of the opportunity to cross-
examine the persons making the entry. This is particularly true
where the hospital record contains the doctor's diagnosis, opinion
or prognosis. However, the federal courts operating under section
1732, have usually admitted the records, conclusions and opinions
notwithstanding. Perhaps the leading case is Reed v. Order of
of United Commercial Travelers42 where a hospital record entry
stated that the plaintiff was "still apparently well under the influ-
ence of alcohol." The court reversed the trial court which had ex-
cluded the record, and further pointed out that there was no signi-
ficant difference between a "diagnosis" and an "observation."
Thomas v. Hogan43 also involved intoxication and the issue of
whether the results of scientific tests were admissible under sec-
tion 1732. The court held that it made no difference whether
the record reflected expression of medical opinion or an observa-
tion of an objective fact. Hospital records were admissible, the
court stated, so long as the record was made in the regular course
of business and it was the regular course of business to make the
record at the time or within a reasonable time thereafter. The
court found that under the federal statute, the proper foundation
for the admission of the results of an intoxication test had been
laid.
41. C. McCoRmIcK, HANDBOOK OF E LAW OF EVIDENCE 609 (lst ed.
1954).
42. 123 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1941).
43. 308 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1962).
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In Gkzwe v. Rulon4" the eighth circuit considered a case where
the defendant offered the plaintiff's hospital records in evidence.
The plaintiff objected to two pages thereof because they contained
opinions, and the doctors rendering those opinions were not pres-
ent in court for cross-examination. The court held that it was not
error to receive the entire records saying: "To have received
the record without the pages objected to, would have been the sub-
stantial equivalent of receiving the records without their con-
tents."45
There are other federal court decisions which allow the admis-
sion of hospital records under the business records exception, de-
spite the fact that they contain conclusive material and opinions.40
It is clear that the federal proposal adheres to the above line of
cases.
There are previous federal decisions excluding hospital records,
and the leading decision would appear to be New York Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Taylor47 which was an action to collect the double
indemnity benefits of a life insurance policy, for an accidental
death. To support its denial of payment, the insurer attempted to
introduce hospital records indicating a diagnosis of definite suicidal
tendencies of the deceased. The trial court rejected the records and
the appellate court upheld this ruling saying that the entries were
not the kind contemplated under section 1732, as their accuracy
was not guaranteed by automatic reflection of observations. The
court concluded that the diagnosis of psychiatric condition involved
conjecture and opinion and, therefore, must be subject to cross-
examination.
Of similar import is Lyles v. United States48 where the defendant
in a criminal prosecution sought to establish a pattern of mental
disease by hospital records. However, the court held them inad-
missible since the admission of a written opinion containing a
psychiatrist's naked conclusion, without his being present for cross-
examination as to the foundation of the opinion, was not war-
ranted by the language or history of section 1732. The court
pointed out that to submit such opinions to the jury, without cross-
44. 284 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1960).
45. Id. at 498.
46. Kissinger v. Frankhouser, 308 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 908 (1963); Medina v. Erickson, 226 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 912 (1956); Buckminster's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944).
47. 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
48. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958).
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examination of the physician, would be to give the opinions the
status of fact and prejudice could easily result.
There are other cases 49 which express a particularly serious ob-
jection to admitting hospital records containing diagnosis of mental
illness or psychiatric conditions, obviously because of the inexact
nature of psychiatry. This has been particularly true in criminal
cases where the defendant's sanity is involved. The Advisory
Committee's Note states that these deciisons excluding conclusion-
ary language and opinions in hospital records were grounded in the
narrow language of section 1732 referring to "act, transaction, oc-
currence, or event," and that this line of cases refusing to admit
such evidence is rejected by the express inclusion of the terms
"opinion and diagnosis" in the federal proposal.50
Therefore, it would appear that the drafters of the Nebraska
proposal chose to follow the lead of Taylor. The question which
was previously posed in this article as to why the Nebraskaa pro-
posal excludes diagnosis and opinion seems to find its answer in
those federal cases rejecting hospital records containing conclu-
sions and opinions. The answer appears to be that the drafters felt
it was important to preserve the right to cross-examine the person
who enters an opinion or diagnosis on a "business record."
VI. CONCLUSION
The present Nebraska and federal statutes containing the busi-
ness records exception to the hearsay rule have been detailed.
The Nebraska and federal proposals in the area have been exam-
ined and compared, and previous decisions of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court and the federal courts have been discussed. By way
of a conclusion, the author's opinion as a practicing trial lawyer is
offered. The Nebraska Rule 803(6) is preferred over the Federal
Rule 803 (6) on the basis of their differing treatment of opinion and
diagnosis, primarily with reference to hospital records. It has been
the author's experience that the medical opinions contained in hos-
pital records are generally there for a very limited purpose; for
example, to support a doctor's order for admission, tests, medicine
or drugs and surgery or discharge. Therefore, these opinions
are often inadequate and can be misleading to a jury of laymen
unless explained and amplified by the physician's testimony in
49. Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1965); Mullican v.
United States, 252 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1958); England v. United States,
174 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1949); Polisnik v. United States, 259 F.2d 951
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
50. PRoP. FED. R. EvW. 803 (6), Advisory Committee's Note.
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court. Secondly, such opinions can be based upon other hearsay;
for example, from the patient, X-ray technicians, nurses and other
doctors. Also, since such opinions are usually expressed in techni-
cal terms, interpretation or explanation is often required. There-
fore, the basis of the opinion as well as the opinion itself should be
explored to avoid prejudice to the opponent of the evidence. In
other words, the right to cross-examine doctors who insert opin-
ions and conclusions in medical records should be preserved.
In the author's opinion, it is the factor of cross-examination
which makes the Nebraska proposal particularly preferable to the
federal proposal. When the physician is present and testifies in
court, the jury takes the doctor's opinion to the jury room after it
has been explored and probed by cross-examination for founda-
tional grounds, for bias, for weakness and for its strength. As a
result, the jury is not forced to accept the opinion in a medical rec-
ord as a proven fact simply because it is in "black and white," but
can consider that opinion for what it is really worth in view of
the cross-examination. By preserving cross-examination of the
doctor's opinion, the jury's understanding is enhanced, the propon-
ent of the evidence presents his case in the most effective manner,
the opponent of the evidence is protected from possible prejudice,
and the ultimate search for the truth is better served.
